This paper examines the European discourses during the recent Euro crisis with regard to the Greek case. It argues that both EU institutions (especially the Commission and the ECB) and a number of member states followed a gradual approach in dealing with the Greek sovereign debt crisis in terms of discourse. First, European discourses showed denial by not recognising the severity of the Greek crisis until Greece’s recourse to official support to avoid default. Instead, European discourses blamed ‘speculators’ and ‘financial predators’ which were unjustifiably and excessively betting on a Greek default. Afterwards, European discourses tried to distance the EU from Greece by stressing the ‘uniqueness’ of the Greek crisis which was irrelevant to the functioning of the Eurozone. Third, European discourses gained a blaming tone by coupling the pre-crisis endemic economic problems of the country with the notorious ‘Greek statistics’ scandal: thus, the EU and other member states were completely unaware of the Greek situation until 2009 when the crisis erupted. It is argued that only when Italy and Spain needed financial support was the EMU-wide nature of the crisis finally recognised. This paper argues that these discourses led to the escalation of the Greek and Euro crises and unleashed an unprecedented EU-wide populism that dominated European public sphere.
