Since the onset of the Korean War in 1950, North Korea has faced sanctions from the United States. This external pressure has been both intensified and broadened in the aftermath of Pyongyangs nuclear testings when the United Nations imposed sanctions against North Korea for the first time. Despite these coercive measures, North Korea maintained stability.
By synthesizing latest results of the research on (smart) sanctions with the complementary research line on autocratic regimes, the paper tries to gain new insights in explaining the empirical puzzle of the longevity of the North Korean regime. This case-study will be interpreted against the theoretical heuristic of a two-level-game. On the international level, we could observe a paradox: While the US tries with differing intensity to lead efforts for regime change, their leverage is too small. China and South Korea’s, however, had and still have enough linkages towards North Korea to provide with sufficient leverage, the political will to denuclearize North Korea is small as it would imply a destabilization of the regime. By referring to the political scapegoat of “imperialism”, the North Korean regime could use the sanctions to produce diffuse legitimacy on the national level. The institutionalized mechanisms underlying this rally-around-the-flag-effect still function fairly well in post-totalitarian North Korea and secure the regime’s stability to a large extent. In such a configuration, sanctions against North Korea cannot (and should not) be effective and resemble no more than mere window-dressing.
