The Boundary Problem and the Value of Democracy

Carter (2011) argues it is mistaken to answer the question ‘equality of what?’ independently of the basis of equality (Carter, 2011: 543). We can only determine in what respect people should be equal, if we know what makes people moral equals in the first place. Analogously to Carter’s analysis of the intensively discussed ‘Equality of what?’-question, we argue that the answer to the boundary question -- who ought to be included in the demos? -- cannot be answered independently of an answer to the prior question of what makes democracy valuable in the first place. That is to say, we cannot answer the question ‘democracy for whom?’ without answering the question ‘why democracy?’ Two answers to the boundary problem have gained the most support, the all-subjected principle (ASP) and the all-affected principle (AAP). Whereas the ASP is a legal way of demarcating the demos (Beckman, 2008: 350f), all those subjected to a given body of laws ought to be included in making those laws in the first place, the AAP is neutral in the sense that it does not, in itself, say anything about what kind of affectedness to base inclusion upon. In its generic version, it merely says “everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the right to participate in that government” (Dahl, 1990: 49; Goodin, 2007: 51). However, these principles have been defended without discussing why democracy is valuable. Some have argued that the AAP is preferable as it enjoins us to include the interests of future generations in democratic decision-making as they, for instance, will be affected by our choice of climate policy as they will have to live in the future climate and hence have a claim right to be included. Whether this is true or not, our claim is that we cannot evaluate this normative claim, that the AAP is the proper boundary principle insofar as it includes future people in democratic decision-making, without an answer as to why we value democracy. Suppose that you are a deliberative democrat and value democracy because it fosters deliberation, that is, discussion among members of all strata of society in a free and equal way. If that is why one values democracy, it does not seem relevant to include the interests of future generations in the democratic discussion, as it is hard to see how the deliberation can be strengthened by inclusion of some who do not exist. Hence, AAP seems unjustified given the reason why one finds democracy valuable in the first place. However, it does not make sense to criticize the AAP for inclusion of the interests of future generations per se, that is, without a particular reason for valuing democracy. If one instead says that democracy is instrumentally valuable because it secures a fair distribution, our answer to the boundary question depends on whether there are intergenerational obligations. If there are, plausibly, the AAP is the proper boundary principle as it makes us more likely to fulfill our intergenerational obligations.