The representative character of the European polity, and the role of MEPs therein, is an important bone of contention among practitioners and academics. What interests, values, norms or objectives are representatives expected to represent? Which different role conceptions can be distinguished among elected representatives? And to what extent do politicians act according to their role conceptions? In this paper I want to move one step beyond a descriptive account of role conceptions and use these as an explanatory factor of observed representational practices adopted by MEPs.
To what extent do representative behavioral practices vary and what can explain this variation? The aim of the paper is to conceptualize varying types of representative behavioral practices and construct a theoretical framework that explains why MEPs adopt these different practices. In addition I will present a research design that enables me to empirically distinguish this variation and the causal mechanisms that may explain why MEPs adopt varying practices. Conceptually, my explanatory framework will make a distinction between individual level factors (such as attitudes, role conception, ideology, age, career pattern, gender) and systemic factors (such as national electoral system, the position of the representative within the parliament, the strength of ties with certain societal interests). While most studies on the European Parliament concentrate on the plenary, this paper will present some preliminary evidence on how MEPs act in committees, more precisely the way they draft, table and debate the amendments to proposed legislation. By looking at this particular venue I expect to find a more fine-grained picture of actual representational practices.
