UN Peacekeeping, Informal Institutions and Intercommunal Election Violence: A Quantitative Case Study of Ivory Coast

In war-torn countries, introducing elections and other formal institutions can threaten the positions of powerful elites, reignite competition over resources and sometimes lead to intercommunal violence between groups supporting opposing political camps. But improving formal institutions to avoid these detrimental consequences takes time. As a short-term remedy, UN peacekeeping operations increasingly work with local-level informal institutions and strengthen alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms among informal authorities (elders, chiefs, women and youth leaders, etc.). Yet, existing research on peacekeeping tends to focus on national-level, formal institutions. We do not know to which extent informal institution-building mitigates the risks of introducing formal institutions, such as elections, and reduces intercommunal violence. This paper proposes that ADR activities strengthen informal institutions and authorities. They provide local leaders with skills to negotiate and mediate local conflicts and create personal contacts between different groups, thereby lessening perceived threats posed by the out-group. In so doing, ADR activities reduce intercommunal violence. I test this implication using violent event data from ACLED and novel monthly data on ADR interventions by UN peacekeepers across 107 departments in Côte d’Ivoire (2009 – 2016). Bivariate probit and matching address non-random assignment of ADR interventions. The paper provides rigorous evidence that ADR activities reduce violence in departments with UN police deployment. Results contribute to research on election violence prevention, post-war peacebuilding and debates on multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations that do not merely deploy troops but shape socio-political relations in their host society.