There are two diametrically opposed views on the proper relationship between academic work and political activism, each of which is convinced that the other represents a violation of scholarly ethics. The first, Weberian position argues that scholars must remain politically neutral. Even if the fact/value distinction cannot be defended on a metaphysical matter, it remains the case that, as a matter of professional ethics, the lectern and the peer-reviewed journal are no place for partisan politics. The second position argues that, since scholarship cannot disengage itself from larger social struggles, the primary responsibility of an academic is to ensure that their work helps rather than hinders the cause of human emancipation. In this view, ethically responsible scholarship is itself a form of political activism.
Given that normative political theory necessarily takes controversial positions on contested political matters, it might seem natural that political philosophers would side with scholar-activists in their dispute with Weberian neutrality. This paper will argue that such a move would be mistaken, and that political philosophy at its best is closer to the Weberian ethic.
Despite its traditional association with what has come to be known as critical theory, activist scholarship, to qualify as such, must adopt an inappropriately uncritical attitude to the cause being advocated. The Weberian position, with its emphasis on pointing out facts that are “inconvenient” for all causes, is actually the more critical of the two. All that is needed to make Weber’s an appropriate ethic for political philosophy is to broaden the category of what can count as inconvenient beyond mere facts to include all forms of evidence, including the kinds of evidence that can justify normative propositions. While political philosophy neither can nor should be value neutral, it must adopt a skeptical attitude toward under-evidenced normative claims made by all political actors, including but hardly limited to those who claim to be advancing an agenda with which a philosopher sympathizes
