With the wide ratification of the UN Convention Against Corruption, asset recovery has been established as international norm. In a typical case of international asset recovery, a government attempts to repatriate funds that a (former) public official has stashed in financial safe havens or attractive property markets abroad. Successful proceedings depend on mutual legal assistance between requesting state and the jurisdiction hosting the illicit assets. But which factors lead to successful proceedings – and why is it that so many cases come to nothing?
Since 2007, the World Bank and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime act as norm entrepreneurs and facilitators. In addition, non-governmental organizations are attempting to raise public awareness and initiate civil-law cases. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the color revolutions, this issue has risen on the political agenda in Europe. Another prominent example concerns the Obiangs from Equatorial Guinea, who were recently forced to give up ill-gotten gains in the United States and France. Yet the history of asset recovery dates back far longer, involving infamous kleptocrats such as Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos from the Philippines and their wealth in Switzerland and elsewhere.
Successful asset recovery depends on resources to investigate, on mutual legal assistance, and ultimately on political cooperation. Governments will only attempt to pursue their former political leaders if the domestic benefits outweigh the costs, which include not only the immediate efforts of the cases themselves but also political instability during periods of transition. States receiving a request for cooperation, on the other hand, must balance domestic political interests – such as diplomatic goals or lobbying from the financial sector – with concerns about international reputation.
Yet these political dynamics have not received a lot of scholarly attention so far. How and why do national authorities vary in their response to requests for assistance? What characteristics associated with requesting states lead to a higher rate of success? Are there trends over time, or sequential patterns associated with gains in experience or exposure to public pressure from previous cases? Drawing on data published by the Stolen Asset Recovery Imitative and additional material, I present first evidence from a new research project on the politics of asset recovery.
