The Limits of Political Championship: Reassessing Commission Leadership in the Euro and Migration Crisis

Recent research suggests that different types of Commission leadership can account for the Commission sometimes being more and sometimes less influential in proposing policy innovations. If the Commission acts as a political champion, suggesting very ambitious proposals it is usually less successful than if it acts as a facilitator. This paper argues the Commission does not choose randomly between the different leadership roles, but that these roles are instead the result of structural factors influencing the Commission's power resources. If the Commission finds support for its proposals among the Member States, it usually assumes the role of a facilitator, whereas it tends to take strong positions in line with a political championship role when its proposal has little support among Member States. We support this argument by analysing two decision processes in which the Commission followed the two distinct leadership styles. During the negotiations around the ESM, the Commission adopted the role of a facilitator, suggesting small packages of reform ideas. In this way, the Commission had a dominant role in shaping the size and scope of the ESM and proposing policy innovations. During the negotiations around temporary and permanent refugee quotas, the Commission acted as a political champion. While it managed to get temporary quotas adopted against the will of several Central Eastern European states, this eventually undermined its attempt to negotiate any long-term proposal on the distribution of refugees. By tracing the decision-making processes around these two decisions, we elucidate the causal mechanism underlying the decision to either adopt a champion or a facilitator role.