Towards a Non-Populist Theory of Direct Democracy

It has become commonplace to say that democracy is in crisis. While this assertion is a matter of debate, it concerns primarily representative democracy. Hence a large scholarly debate has developed on how to reform representative democracy in order to promote citizen participation and to enhance the legitimacy of democratic institutions. In the field of political theory the dominant answer has been deliberative democracy. Surprisingly, few political theorists have explored the potential of instruments of direct democracy (DD), such as popular initiatives and facultative referendums. Indeed, we lack a theory of DD. As Michael Saward has observed, "the institutions of DD do not have tables at the democratic theory feast". This relative absence of theoretical treatments of DD stands in sharp contrast with the rise of referendums all over the globe and with a large comparative-empirical literature dedicated to it. One element that explains the skepticism of theorists of democracy towards DD is that it is typically seen as populism-enabling. The aim of this paper is to show that, under certain conditions (both theoretical and empirical), DD can be populism-inhibiting and support the institutions of representative democracy. The bulk of the paper will consist in defining the theoretical and normative conditions under which a non-populist direct democracy can enhance citizen participation and improve the overall legitimacy of democratic institutions. I will first indicate and address the three main components of the critique of DD driven by the fear of populism: (a) voter ignorance, (b) tyranny of the majority, and (c) insufficient deliberation. I will then elaborate three theoretical claims - (a) the importance of unstable majorities and minorities fostered by a frequent use of DD, (b) the demos-enhancing function of DD, and (c) the valve function of DD - that shall allow us to recognize the non-populist potential of direct democracy. The analysis will be mostly theoretical but it will be supported by selected empirical examples. In particular, it will be argued that direct democracy can be innovated by introducing more deliberation into the system, by following for example the model of "Citizens' Initiative Review" in Oregon.