Class as a Form of Structural Domination

In this paper I argue for the relevance and distinctive significance of the concept of class for republican theorists. I focus on two ways in which class prevents the realization of freedom as non-domination, arguing that it is itself a form of structural domination, and that it prevents the development of a politics of the common good. Conceiving of class as a form of structural domination enables us to understand the concept of structural domination more clearly, in particular shedding light on the role of intention. We can understand class as a form of structural domination that emerges out of market activity and relations, but which extends across both economic and social realms. Following Weber’s conception of class, we can view the market as a distributive mechanism for both economic goods and social opportunities, that systematically favours those who enter from a position of power (Weber, 1978, 302). As such, capitalist markets tend towards a concentration of power and property; those who lack these resources are left in a position of market dependence on the wealthy, on whom they rely for continued economic resources and opportunities. This market dependence directly translates into social dependence, as the market distributes opportunities and life chances towards those in a privileged market position. Those without property are not subject to any particular member of the propertied class, but are systematically disempowered across social, economic, and political realms, and thus prevented from participating fully in. We can therefore understand class as a distinctive form of structural domination emerging out of market activity. Class societies are also unable to develop fully a politics of the common good. Republicans are committed to the idea that the freedom of each citizen is dependent on the freedom of their compatriots, and that this common interest in non-domination can form a basis for political decision-making and deliberation (Pettit, 2004, 150). In cases of class domination, though, the material and social conditions for this kind of politics are absent, as the interests of the propertied and the propertyless are directly antagonistic. Such conflict undermines the idea that these groups can share common interests, with class appearing a more appropriate domain of solidarity than the community as a whole. Understanding class as a form of structural domination has implications for how we understand the nature of these forms of domination. The nature of structural domination is one of the most significant issues in contemporary republican theory, with disagreement about whether domination requires an identifiable agent, and whether it must be the result of intentional action (Gourevitch, 2013; Schuppert, 2015; Thompson, 2013). Our account of class suggests that a general account of structural domination must incorporate cases of unintentional domination that emerge from the relative positions or resources of agents. I discuss how such cases might be successfully incorporated into an account of structural domination without sacrificing theoretical force or clarity.