The coexistence of a harsh disapproval of corruption and the limited electoral consequences of malfeasant behavior is still a conundrum in social sciences. While elections are expected to be used as an instrument to hold corrupt politicians accountable, studies conducted in multiple countries indicate that voters rarely punish corrupt politicians. One of the potential explanations for this paradox is that citizens might value competence over honesty when evaluating a candidate and casting a vote. The honesty vs. competence hypothesis suggests that voters may forgive corrupt candidates when they are efficient and capable of “delivering the goods”. However, previous studies have not analyzed the effect of public decisions that involve a direct trade-off between honesty and efficiency. In this paper we put this hypothesis to a direct test through an experimental moral dilemma that clearly reflects this trade-off. In this experiment—included in a representative survey of the Spanish population (N=1,500)—we examine participants’ evaluations and likelihood of voting for a politician that faces a moral dilemma in a public bidding process in which being corrupt leads to the most efficient outcome. In this dilemma the politician can either adopt a decision that does not follow the established legal procedure but leads to the optimal and welfare enhancing outcome, or she can adopt a decision that, even if it leads to a suboptimal outcome, follows the appropriate legal procedure.
