The Effectiveness of Regional Maritime Crime Governance: Comparing Institutional Designs

Maritime piracy and armed robbery, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and other maritime crimes increasingly endanger the marine environment as well as the security of persons and ships at sea. To counter these crimes, the last decade has seen the emergence of various state-to-state agreements in different world regions. Despite striking similarities in their institutional design, in parts these agreements also differ significantly, and thus constitute an interesting case for the study of institutional effectiveness. To scrutinize the link between the effectiveness of maritime crime governance and specific institutional design features, I conduct a comparative case study of three regional agreements in Asia, West Africa, and East Africa, and explain differences in their membership provisions and their degree of legal obligation. To assess the agreements’ effectiveness, I conceptually distinguish between an institution’s impact on its ultimate governance target and its functional effectiveness. Using qualitative methods, and focusing on counter-piracy, I subsequently study the impact these different institutional features have on solving the problem of maritime piracy. Results suggest that while all three agreements are effective in implementing the tasks that have been assigned to them, such as information sharing and capacity building, they are less effective in combating piracy. Discussing several possible explanations for this finding, I argue that particularly in Southeast Asia open membership provisions and a high degree of legal obligation deter regional key states from accession, which eventually undermines the effectiveness of a joint cooperation effort.