Compromise and Virtue in Democratic Politics: A Neo-Aristotelian View

Compromises are part and parcel of life, particularly public life. In recent years, moral and political philosophers have paid increasing attention to the ethics of compromise-making. Their discussions, however, mostly concern the question whether particular compromises are justifiable or not, rather than the question how one can make compromises well. But if compromises must be made in (public) life, as (I assume) they occasionally must, it is an important question how one can ‘compromise with character’, that is to say, virtuously. So far, virtue-ethical theorizing about compromises is scarce; most work on compromises is deontological or consequentialist. Yet, since virtue ethics is arguably more situation-sensitive than the other two, it is potentially more helpful to assess the often complex casuistry of compromises. In order to contribute to this alternative approach towards compromise, this paper discusses the moral and epistemic virtues required for good compromise-making and the way in which virtue ethics can be used to assess (and improve) the moral quality of processes of compromise-making and their outcomes. In the paper, I will first argue more in-depth why the common framework of ethical thinking about compromises is helpful but insufficient. Next, drawing on contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethical work, I will present the outlines of a virtue ethics of compromise-making. Then, thirdly, this novel approach will be applied to concrete cases of compromise-making, particularly in the context of present-day democratic politics. In the concluding section, finally, I discuss the potential and limitations of this approach and some remaining challenges for those who wish to elaborate it further. With these four steps, the paper aims to highlight the theoretical and practical relevance of adopting a virtue-ethical understanding of what good compromise-making involves.