The Time-Variant Logic of Parliamentary Debate

Studies on the allocation of speaking time have so far focused on legislators' characteristics and incentives for parliamentary party groups originating from the respective electoral system. This strand of literature has concluded that MPs with deviating views give fewer speeches – particularly when the respective electoral system rewards party unity. We build on these insights and argue that the significance of a) MPs’ individual level features and b) party unity is dependent on the chronological context of plenary debates. In particular, we test two theoretical implications: First, we expect those MPs who previously deviated from the party line in their speeches to have smaller chances to speak again. Second, considerations resulting from coalition governance are likely to modify these effects for governing parties. Particularly during election campaigns, the party leadership may strategically allow dissenting MPs to the floor, since government parties have electoral incentives to differentiate from their coalition partners. We evaluate our expectations with the help of models that predict the participation of MPs in debates in a certain period. We make use of a novel data set covering all speeches given during one or two legislative terms in the Estonian, Finnish, German, Irish, Norwegian and Swedish parliament.