Duties Towards Animals as Duties to the Self

For Kant humans respect for animals is, first of all, a perfect duty to ourselves and, secondly, an indirect duty to animals. Kant’s theory represents a compelling option for the justification of a coherent and rigorous animal ethics, the potential of which has not been fully appreciated yet. On the other hand, Kantian argument can play a role in the contemporary animal ethics debate only if it is possible to support the existence of duties to the self. Whereas most contemporary philosophers think that there are no duties to the self, some contemporary authors agree with Kant: far from being contradictory, the concept of duty to the self points to the ground of validity for each and every type of moral duty, i.e. the moral autonomy of the rational being. In my paper I will analyse the possibility of duties to the self, concentrating on those characteristics of these duties, which are in my opinion required in order to provide the Kantian argument for indirect duties regarding animals with a solid foundation. Duties to the self should not be in fact simply prudential principles, but strict moral obligations. Moreover, they should have, as moral obligation, a specific content and not simply indicate the right kind of motivation in bringing about a commanded action. It should also be made clear if they are necessarily related to the idea that the rational being has an intrinsic and absolute value that must be respected in all circumstances. In my paper I will argue that the close connection between the autonomy of moral agents and their intrinsic value makes possible a justification of the duties to the self.