When intertemporal policy conflicts arise in democratic political systems, short-term interests tend to prevail over long-term interests. Such outcomes threaten the interests of future generations, especially when the resulting harm is widespread and/or irreversible. Proposals to tackle the short-termist tendencies in democratic processes abound. These include: constitutional and quasi-constitutional reforms; the creation of future-focused public institutions; improved foresight capabilities and planning mechanisms; more open, consultative and deliberative policy-making processes; the strengthening or implementation of new procedural and substantive commitment devices; reforms to analytical frameworks and methodologies; revised accounting rules and conventions (e.g. to incorporate natural capital and ecosystem services); better early warning, monitoring and reporting regimes; employing policy nudges and choice architecture to counter cognitive biases; and nurturing a more future-oriented political culture.
This paper summarizes the various proposals for institutional and policy reform and identifies the six main intervention logics on which they are based, namely: 1) changing the motives of policy-makers so that they care more about future interests; 2) changing the political incentives facing policy-makers such that it is in their interests to give more weight to long-term considerations; 3) enhancing the capacity of policy-makers to exercise foresight and protect long-term interests; 4) constraining the formal decision-rights of policy-makers when long-term interests are at risk; 5) insulating policy-makers from short-term political pressures; and 6) enhancing the capacity for policy coordination across different tiers of government. Drawing on recent research, the paper outlines a framework for evaluating proposals to safeguard long-term interests – based on considerations of political and technical feasibility, effectiveness and overall desirability – and assesses their relative merits.
