In recent decades, technological and scientific developments such as artificial intelligence, have presented many new challenges to public policy. Despite the difficulty of regulating such complex technologies, they have raised fundamental moral questions. To deal with these moral questions, a search for professionals with relevant expertise has begun. Philosophers have been among the central candidates for this task, and they are currently taking part in an increasing number of committees and decision-making processes as moral experts who can assist politicians and bureaucrats in handling such moral issues. However, as with other kinds of experts, many have warned of the undemocratic and technocratic implications of philosophers’ involvement in public policy. Furthermore, questions regarding their position as moral experts, and the particular insights they can bring to the decision-making process, remain heavily debated among scholars. Many have accepted the moral expertise of philosophers, but only in a narrower sense, which they have thought to undermine their necessity or relevance for public policy. According to this narrow notion of moral expertise, philosophers do not have any privileged access to moral truths or special moral authority. Instead, they can only assist others in formulating their own moral judgments. This paper reexamines the normative implications of moral expertise for public policy. It underlines the benefits of philosophers’ involvement in public decision-making, especially when complex, extensive, and morally-charged decisions are on the table. It argues that even the narrow notion of moral expertise supports far-reaching implications, extending beyond what scholars tend to admit. If the state ought to thoroughly consider its policy in order to accept the most suitable option and avoid unnecessary harm to its citizens, then the moral expertise of philosophers can contribute to this endeavor. Therefore, the state has a duty to include philosophers in many public decisions as it does with other experts such as lawyers, economists, and engineers. Moreover, it ought to do so not only in scientific and medical issues. The paper elaborates on the justifications for these claims, responds to the warning on the undemocratic problems of philosophers in decision-making and considers the practical implications of the argument.
