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How Strong is the President in Government Formation? A New Classification and the Czech Case

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Comparative Politics
Constitutions
Executives
Government
Coalition
Qualitative
Miloš Brunclík
Charles University
Lubomir Kopeček
Masaryk University
Miloš Brunclík
Charles University

Abstract

One of the key areas in which presidents in Central and Eastern Europe manifest their appetite is in the government formation process (GFP). In addition, the GFP is undoubtedly one of the most important competencies presidents in European countries have at their disposal. This can be well illustrated by the fact that this power has been used as a proxy to assess the degree of presidential activism. The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we present an original classification of the roles of presidents in GFP reflecting real constitutional practice, moving beyond comparing formal constitutional rules. This is an attempt to construct a general qualitative framework to assess and distinguish various degrees of presidential influence over the outcome of the GFP. It can be applied basically to all European parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes in which the head of state, prime minister (PM) and his/her cabinet are accountable to the parliament. Second, applying the classification, we bring systematic comparative analysis of the roles Czech presidents have played in all GFPs since the establishment of an independent Czechia in 1993. In particular, we show that the Czech presidents have been quite powerful in the GFP, both in terms of formal constitutional rules and in actual political practice, which holds true even for the period that preceded the introduction of the popular presidential elections in 2012. Third, we demonstrate that the degree of influence presidents exerted over all cases of GFP in Czechia have varied significantly despite the fact that formal constitutional rules have remained constant.