On the (Il-)legitimacy of Democratic-Autocratic Military Interventions in the MENA

Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen are in the middle of internationalised military conflicts, with several states and (transnational) non-state actors being involved as conflict parties. Even though the three cases are very different, they have one aspect in common: both democracies and autocracies have intervened – and they have done so at least partially “on the same side”. This means that these military actions are marked by some form of democratic-autocratic cooperation. The proposed paper will explore the normative dimensions of democratic-autocratic cooperation in military interventions. Using the intervention in Iraq and Syria known as “Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve” as a case study, it will ask whether and to what extent such mixed interventions can claim legitimacy. I will draw on different traditions of just war theory for assessing the legitimacy of going to war at all (jus ad bellum) and which means can be considered justified (jus in bello). Moreover, the difference between input and output legitimacy is crucial in this context. As Stefano Recchia has argued, authorisation by either the UN or regional multilateral organisations generates output legitimacy for (humanitarian) interventions in several ways, even though some procedural and organisational aspects of these authorisation processes may be flawed (Recchia 2016). However, the issue of authorisation in terms of multilateral mandating was very complex in the case of “Inherent Resolve”. The legal basis of the military operation “Inherent Resolve” is intensely debated by experts, mainly because the coalition targets areas in two different national territories. While the intervention in Iraq appears unproblematic (“intervention by invitation”), the legal situation is more complicated with regard to Syria. In fact, there was no mandate for the operations until November 2015. This changed with UNSC Resolution 2249. Yet, the significance of the resolution with regard to the authorization of the use force is still contested. Moreover, the involvement of authoritarian states in the intervention and the burden-sharing arrangements related to this form of cooperation raise normative questions. Does the involvement of regional, but autocratic actors enhance or diminish the (output) legitimacy of the intervention? It could be argued that regional participation in interventions enhances their legitimacy in terms of acceptability by local populations because the interventions are not perceived as “foreign”. At the same time, though, Western cooperation with autocracies like Saudi Arabia casts doubt on the liberal purposes of, motivation for and values behind such interventions. In the case of “Inherent Resolve”, it is particularly interesting that most Western powers at first only conducted air strikes over Iraq, i.e. took over the less delicate part of the intervention. It could be argued that democratic-autocratic cooperation in interventions allows for burden-sharing arrangements that let the West keep its clean, law-abiding and liberal image while the “dirty work” is done by its cooperation partners. What would this imply for the legitimacy of these interventions as a whole?