(Un-) Optimal German Duumvirate with France in the Post-Crisis Strategy of Deepening the Euro Area

The eurozone crisis has created a new perspective for EU integration, which effectiveness is seen in the abandonment of the supranational narration to the intergovernmental method. According to this perspective, Germany strives for strengthening its role in the eurozone as a “principal” through the close partnership with France (as an informal institution). The hegemonic role imposed on Germany during the financial and debt EU crisis, is contrary to their constitution economy. Based on the theory of neo-institutionalism and the new intergovernmentalism, the article analyses the structure of the German-French duumvirate, whose post-crisis purpose is to deepen (through the new governance and the reform) the Economic and Monetary Union. However, according to the theory of rational choice, this partnership is not optimal for the German concept of the policy of order (Ordnungpolitik) and involves the possibility of its decomposition.