Theories of secession divide into two kinds. Remedial theories hold that a right to unilaterally secede from a political society arises as a remedy to injustices committed by the state against a particular group. General theories hold that a group has a unilateral right to secede from a political society even if that group has suffered no injustice. Both theories hold that a theory of secession must be grounded in a theory of political justification. An adequate theory of secession requires an account of the nature and limits of the right to rule.
These theories rest on an implicit assumption that the right to rule over persons and the right to control a territory are equivalent. Moreover, they assume that territorial rights are grounded in property rights that are independent of political society. Kant’s political theory raises a serious problem for these assumptions. First, Kant recognizes that the relationship between a right to rule over persons and a right to control a territory requires explanation. Second, Kant holds that rights to land are only conclusive within a political society. For this reason he holds that government must be regarded as the supreme proprietor of the land. No individual or group has a conclusive right to a territory except within a political society. If Kant is right about this, unilateral secession is much more difficult to justify than contemporary theorists have recognized.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to defend this Kantian objection to contemporary accounts of secession. Second, it aims to develop a Kantian theory of secession. I will show that, under certain conditions, Kantian theory allows for unilateral secession from a political society. However, those conditions are best described as one in which the political society dissolves and returns to the state of nature.
