India is also an unusual, possibly even unique case, as it has faced at least one, and often more, armed insurrections within its territory continuously since independence, while maintaining a system of democratic rule and an independent judiciary with powers of government oversight throughout that period, with one brief exception – during the Indira Gandhi declared ‘emergency’ of 1975 to 1977. This combination of continuous armed challenge with a relatively resilient democracy, makes India a very interesting case in the post ‘war on terror’ and Arab Spring era of continuing global democratisation combining with widespread and protracted civil conflict. Focusing on the most significant challenges to its authority and legitimacy, from the failed / suppressed insurrection in Punjab in the 1980s which has not re-ignited, the Kashmir conflict, the multiple conflicts in the North East and the on-going Naxalite/ Maoist insurgency this paper explores the discourse of the Indian state on domestic insurgency and how this has farmed its approach to opening or committing seriously to negotiations. The over-emphasis of Pakistan as a wholly illegitimate external factor (from the perspective of the Indian state) has damaged opportunities for negotiations when they seemed to exist. Even where attempts are made to deal with under-lying conditions, when this has been done without recognising the political role of insurgent groups and their wider communities – and therefore to some extent their organisational legitimacy – such efforts have not succeeded. This paper argues that the characterization of the legitimacy (or otherwise) of insurgent groups and their demands plays a key determining role in the Indian state’s approach to negotiation.
