The management of public risk in the EU has increasingly been organised through the establishment of a ‘transnational bureaucracy’: Specialised EU agencies act as hubs in networks of regulators from the Member States. Hereby, the literature has often emphasised the informal characteristics of these governmental networks, such as mutual learning across national authorities in the forum of an EU agency. Yet, some of these agencies have tasks of oversight over national regulators. This paper explores the case of one such agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), which is faced with an inherent tension between hierarchical and egalitarian tasks: EMSA inspects national maritime safety regulators in relation to their compliance with EU maritime safety law, thereby acting as prolonged arm of the Commission. At same time, however, it acts as partner agency to national regulators by providing a node for mutual exchange of practices with the aim of furthering a common ‘maritime safety culture’. Whereas previous studies of EMSA have emphasised the prevalence of the latter aspect, this analysis argues that the hierarchical elements embedded in the tasks of the agency inhibit the potential of exchange of practices in the forum of the agency. An analysis of official documents and in-depth interviews with UK and German officials show that -even for administrations with large capacity and expertise- the shadow of hierarchy looms large. Nevertheless, the hierarchical system is maintained since national regulators draw at least some distinct advantages from the inspection tasks of EMSA. Moreover, the underlying logic of control of maritime risk employed by national authorities is partly congruent with hierarchical notions, whereby harmonisation of practices is seen to enhance safety.
