On the Perils of Presidential Autonomy for the Institutionalisation of European Party Systems, 1848ꟷ2014

The debate about whether presidential regimes or parliamentary regimes are better suited to democracy has elicited a substantial scholarly literature. Yet very few studies address the impact of presidential autonomy on the prospects for party system institutionalization—an essential condition for the consolidation of democracy (“presidential autonomy” refers to the two dimensions of (semi-)presidentialism—direct election and constitutional powers). Seeking to fill the gap, this paper aims to establish whether presidential autonomy is as perilous for party system institutionalization as the scholarly consensus would suggest. In particular, the paper tests some of the most important arguments advanced by scholars in the presidentialism/parliamentarism debate in light of the relationships between regime type and the development and institutionalization of party systems in new democracies. The paper starts with a quantitative analysis of presidential autonomy on the process of institutionalization in 72 European party systems since 1848. Qualitative cases are used to take a closer look at the mechanisms at work.