Germany, Hegemonic Power, and the Future of Europeanised Defence

Germany’s economic strength has given it in a role within Europe that could be seen as hegemonic – that is, evincing some of the characteristics of a hegemon but without actually being one. To explain, Germany has used its economic strength to clearly claim the leading position within Europe’s macroeconomic issue areas. For instance, Germany fundamentally shaped and drove Europe’s response to the sovereign debt crisis. Outside the realm of macroeconomic policy though, the story has been quite different. So far, Germany has transformed its economic strength into only a limited political-diplomatic leadership position in Europe, while almost completely eschewing the pursuit of greater hard power or military strength, preferring instead to exercise what little hard power it has from within an institutional framework. This example of an economic hegemon failing to fully pursue political and military hegemony as well is unique in history. Neorealism, one of the dominant schools of thought in political science, argues that the self-help nature of the international system virtually compels – or at least strongly incentivizes – states with high levels of latent, economic power to parlay it into political and military power. Yet, for reasons that are tied to the 20th century’s world wars and the holocaust, Germany continues to largely shun serious development of its hard power in land, air, maritime, space, or cyber domains. Given more recent history though – since the end of the Cold War – there may be reason to think that Germany’s views are changing with regard to hard power and its use in Europe and beyond to defend German as well as Western interests. Already German soldiers are today deploying, fighting, and dying abroad – usually operating within an institutional framework but occasionally without such scaffolding – all without prompting a political backlash at home. Over the last quarter century, German attitudes toward military power, international responsibility, and the appropriate use of the Bundeswehr have changed dramatically. There is no reason to think that additional evolution is not possible. On the contrary, further evolution is likely, given what has unfolded in a relatively short time period, the continuing desire of Germany’s leaders to take on more responsibility, and a kind of untapped willingness on the part of the public to be led by German decision-makers in this regard. Given this, it is entirely probable that Berlin will confront less and less pressure – domestically, at least – to ‘Europeanize’ German hard power. How this will be greeted by Germany’s neighbors remains to be seen.