In its long-term policy strategies, the European Commission calls upon the EU member states to decarbonize their national economies by 2050 (EC, 2018, EU, 2012). Trivially, a climate neutral economy entails an entirely decarbonized power system, but so do also less ambitious scenarios: the Roadmap 2050, for example, foresees up 99% power system decarbonization to support the European target of 80-95% economy-wide emission reduction compared to 1990.
For the power sector decarbonization, three broad options are available. The first option is renewable power, including wind, solar, hydro and biomass power, domestically or in cooperation with other countries. The second option foresees the reconfiguration of the existing system and a switch to lower-carbon thermal power (e.g. from coal to gas power) and then to low-carbon options (e.g. carbon-capture and storage) and zero-carbon conventional electricity (e.g. nuclear power). The third option is to reduce demand in order to save electricity and consume less (potentially) climate-harming electricity in the first place.
From a technological perspective, countries may use all three options in parallel; this could even be desirable, as their different strengths may complement each other. From a political perspective, however, previous research (e.g. (Lipsmeyer et al., 2017, Franzese and Hays, 2006)) has shown that policies often compete for political attention – and ultimately resources – in agenda setting as well as policy implementation, which effectively leads to tradeoffs between the different pathways.
We investigate empirically whether there is competition between the three options in Europe, by identifying whether Member States prioritize different options while neglecting others. For this, we investigate national executive strategies, legislative action (e.g. number of policies, level of ambition) and budgetary information (e.g. resources spent on policies, R&D funding for individual technologies). Specifically, we analyze in a longitudinal study (2003-2018) whether and to what extent a) governments favor one (or two) technological pathways in their distribution of resources – financial and non-financial – in their energy/climate strategies, b) national strategies diverge or are increasingly harmonized within the EU, and c) a particular strategy correlates with higher climate ambitions.
We expect to show that governments pick winners as countries do not follow all paths simultaneously, suggesting that the three technologically compatible options are political contestants and compete for attention and resources: progress in one area may come at the expense of stagnation in another.
EC 2018. A Clean Planet for all. COM(2018) 773 final. Brussels: European Commission.
EC 2011. Energy Roadmap 2050. COM(2011) 885. Brussels: European Commission.
FRANZESE, R. J. & HAYS, J. C. 2006. Strategic Interaction among EU Governments in Active Labor Market Policy-making:Subsidiarity and Policy Coordination under the European Employment Strategy. European Union Politics, 7, 167-189.
LIPSMEYER, C. S., PHILIPS, A. Q. & WHITTEN, G. D. 2017. The effects of immigration and integration on European budgetary trade-offs. Journal of European Public Policy, 24, 912-930.
