Intuitions and the History of Ideas in Contemporary Political Theory

Intuitions have come to play an increasingly prominent role in philosophical enquiry. Views on the nature and role of intuitions vary, from the ‘Centrality Thesis’ which argues that intuitions are the central evidence relied upon by philosophers, to those that are more sceptical of any evidentiary value. In moral philosophy, for example, a reliance on intuitions has both a long history, as well as a ‘new wave’ in experimental philosophy. The role of intuitions has extended beyond moral philosophy to political theory. Facets of contemporary analytic political theory assess the rigour of conceptual claims with reference to intuitive judgments, including both the measurement and definition of political concepts. ‘Freedom’, for example, has been the subject of conceptual claims, in terms of both measurement and definition, that rely on intuitive judgments. In this way, intuitions are the yardstick of the rigour of the conceptual claim. A particular consequence of this reliance on intuitions is a diminished dependence on the history of ideas. Insofar as conceptual claims can be premised on intuitions, a regard for the history of a given concept is less relevant. If ‘freedom’ is defined and measured with reference to intuitions, its expression and variation over time are of little relevance. In this paper, I address the role that intuitions have in our understanding of political concepts and the extent to which they are independent of the history of ideas. I argue that there is an essential relationship between the use of intuitions in political theory and the history of ideas, which arises from the terms used to make conceptual claims. Even where a conceptual claim is evidenced through intuitions, the terms employed in making conceptual claims nonetheless possess a historical character. A philosopher might have an intuitive sense of what constitutes ‘freedom’, arrived at independently from the history of ideas, yet the term ‘freedom’ has its own historical connotations. I first examine the role that intuitions have come to play in contemporary political theory and the extent of their independence from the history of ideas. I then rely on the Kripkean notion of the ‘chain of communication’ to establish how the terms that refer to political concepts come to have historical character. This has the effect of essentially watermarking terms with their historical dimensions. I argue that this historical watermark extends to conceptual claims that rely on intuitive judgments. In doing so, I explore how philosophers may continue to premise conceptual claims on intuitions, while still having regard for the history of ideas. I conclude with a broader assessment of the relationship between contemporary political theory, and its use of intuitions, with the study of the history of ideas.