The global governance of climate change has long been a paramount example of multilateral governance, with its regime based on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to which virtually all States are parties and its sophisticated system of incremental multilateral negotiations. Over the past decade, this system of multilateral governance has gripped and some have put at least part of the blame on rising multipolar tensions (Grevi, G. De Vasconcelos, A., 2008; Roberts J.T, 2011). In parallel, a growing literature has described and analysed the contribution of transnational actors to the global governance of climate change (Price R, 2003; Andonova, L., Betsill M.M., Bulkeley, H., 2007).
Yet, the possible linkages between these two trends in global climate governance remain under-researched. This may be due to the fact that these two literatures have developed in separate stream of international relations theories. On the one hand, multipolar arguments derive from a neo-realist vision of the world where effective multilateralism hinges upon a favourable balance of powers and where non-state actors play a mere secondary role. On the other hand, studies of transnationalism have risen precisely to challenge the omnipotent role of States in global governance and have thus treated ‘polarity’ as irrelevant to their argument. And yet, if one takes both multipolarity and transnationalism seriously, the question of their relationship automatically arises. Do transnational actors constitute a buffer against multipolar tensions and contribute to the stability of the multilateral system? Or, on the contrary, do they accompany, reinforce or in any other way contribute to multipolar trends? This paper will engage the discussion, taking ground in the above-mentioned literature and examples from the climate negotiations since Copenhagen in 2009 and propose ways to bridge them, with the aim of achieving a more comprehensive understanding of contemporary climate governance.
