Sanctions under the Stability and Growth Pact: The European Commission between Punishment and Pacification

How does a supranational bureaucracy sanction a sovereign state? Despite a wealth of literature on the role of the European Commission in EU economic governance, scholars have thus far neglected to study the Commission’s role as enforcer of sanctions under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). However, recent events in Spain, Portugal and Italy raise important questions regarding the Commission’s motivations and behaviour in these highly salient cases where member states clash with EU fiscal rules. This contribution examines the conditions, both endogenous and exogenous to the Commission, that shape its decisions on sanctions in the SGP framework. Using outcome-oriented process-tracing methodology, we investigate the ideational, institutional, political and economic conditions that shape Commission decision-making. We explicitly pay attention to how the construction of preferences and ideas, both within different directorates within the Commission as well as reputational concerns vis-à-vis other actors, shaped final decisions on sanctions. As such, we aim to transcend single-theory explanations in order to provide a more accurate and comprehensive explanation of Commission action.