This conceptual article explores the difficulties of influencing (or de-biasing) the decision-making behavior of government policymakers through choice architecture (which also has been called “meta-regulation”). It develops three arguments: First, we argue that biases in the behavior of policymakers are often a combination – or mutual reinforcement – of cognitive limitations resulting from bounded rationality and strategic considerations that are linked to institutional interests about organizational reputation. Second, we argue that these mechanisms of organisational behavior result in a focus of policymakers on developing successful policy options. Third, we argue that attempts to impose wider considerations onto policymakers, i.e. to “de-bias” their behavior towards a more balanced response to problems, will be met by the deployment of various “coping strategies” that allow them to comply with external demands without substantively change the behavior these demands target. Our analysis has implications for both established approaches to better regulation and the emerging debate on using behavioral insights to de-bias policymakers.
