'Contested Multilateralism' as Credible Signalling: How Strategic Inconsistency can Induce Cooperation among States

This paper analyzes theoretically how the patterns of institutionalized international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a great power, pursues a strategy of contested multilateralism (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining which lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation in the long run and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM serves as a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Thanks to this ability, CM alters not only the institutional, but also the strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for an inter-institutional feedback loop which increases the realized cooperation gains. Whether CM exerts positive or negative effects on the realization of cooperation gains depends on the durability of the focal institution under the status quo, and on the duration of the institutional adjustment bargaining. We develop our argument verbally and using a simple spatial model. We probe the robustness of our theoretical reasoning with the use of a computer simulation replicating the spatial model.