ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Overseeing Surveillance Powers – The Cases of Poland and Slovakia

Comparative Politics
European Union
Government
Institutions
Security
Courts
Power
Big Data
Mateusz Kolaszyński
Jagiellonian University
Mateusz Kolaszyński
Jagiellonian University

Abstract

The paper aims to present the most important issues related to oversight over surveillance powers in Poland and Slovakia. The word „surveillance powers” used in the study refers particularly to covert techniques and practices of gathering personal data which occurs without the monitored subjects’ knowledge or approval. Such surveillance powers are typically carried out by police services and intelligence agencies, and are more politically sensitive, as well as closely related to core issues of power and security. Oversight over these services and their surveillance powers is the standard in democratic states. The system of control and oversight consists of formal institutions (executive control, parliamentary oversight, judicial oversight, expert bodies etc.) and informal institutions (the public, whistleblowers, civil society organizations, the media etc.). Before 1989, there was a similar model of security services in both analyzed countries. During Communism, there was no civil and democratic oversight over police services and intelligence agencies. Under the communist system control over security services was exercised by an inner circle representing the highest levels of the Communist party. In fact, these structures were subject to the party, not to the state. Security services were a part of the ministries which were highly centralized, hierarchized and party-dependent. In addition, surveillance powers were used to fight the political opposition. Finally, since the early 1990s Poland and Slovakia had to build new systems of control and oversight over surveillance powers. Nowadays, both countries are members of the European Union and the Council of Europe. The basic issue of the paper is to describe how the systems of control and oversight look in Poland and Slovakia in the post-Snowden era. Are they compatible with the standards in the area of secret surveillance developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union? Are there any similarities between Poland and Slovakia in this matter? Finally, can these similarities relate to the communist past?