Private Authority and Regulatory Dynamics in Regime Complexes

The concept of regime complexes, which Kal Raustiala and David Victor define as “an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions”, received tremendous attention in the global governance literature over the last decade. Scholarship on regime complexes has for a long time predominantly focused on interactions among intergovernmental institutions, thus neglecting that private institutions play an increasing role in providing transnational regulation. Therefore, recent studies have begun to examine the role of private authority and their relationship to intergovernmental institutions. For instance, some studies argue that private authority oftentimes complements public rules and expands their impact or that it provides a forum for experimentalism, helping states to reduce uncertainties. While this relatively new literature attributes a rather constructive role to private authority in regime complexes, little is known about the causes and effects of public-private regulatory disruptions and conflicts. This paper addresses this gap in the literature, asking how interactions among private and intergovernmental institutions shape regulatory dynamics in regime complexes. The paper follows a threefold objective: First, it explains how public-private disruptions and conflicts can emerge even if both forms of governance exhibit no overlap in membership and are structured in hierarchical relationships. Second, it theorizes how public-private interactions cause regulatory dynamics. Third, it tests the arguments for three comparative cases: The regime complex for international financial stability, intellectual property – internet and the trade – environment complex.