A Typology of Lobbying and Corruption

Historically, lobbying and corruption are related concepts. The origin of the lobbying regulation is to prevent politicians from becoming corrupt. The rules are legal and ethical guidelines that distinguish undue means of influence from socially accepted means of influence. These distinctions, however, vary from country to country and in the U.S. even from state to state. Accordingly, the definitions of what is lobbying and what is corruption differ between political systems making it difficult to formulate and evaluate effective but moderate lobbying regulation. Not only legal definitions and distinctions differ. Practitioners also have varying notions of what is sound lobbying and what is corrupt. American and German lobbyists, when faced with the question of how they define corruption, sometimes struggle to distinguish their everyday work from the definition of corruption they quoted in expert interviews. Their perceptions of the distinction between lobbying and corruption range from it is not the same at all to maybe they are not distinct. This paper aims to make sense of these competing notions. Firstly, drawing on expert interviews with American lobbyists in four states and German lobbyists on federal level, this paper develops a more sophisticated understanding of when lobbying turns into corruption. Based on qualitative data, it develops a typology of lobbying and corruption along different dimensions. Secondly, the paper identifies differences and/or similarities of the perception of the spread of corruption and the definition of corruption in the interest mediation systems of the U.S. and Germany. Finally, the developed typology is used to evaluate the current state of regulation in the United States and Germany and specifically and give general practical advice to policymakers.