Critics have often highlighted that the 1999 Tampere decision to establish a common EU Asylum system has been too focused on security and not enough on human rights, leading to increased denial of protection for asylum seekers. This paper focuses on a controversial asylum policy, which highlights the fine line between and cooperation and discord in the EU: the safe country of origin (SCO) principle. This policy is revolves around having a list of countries deemed “safe,” which ensures asylum seekers from these countries are fast—tracked through the system and likely denied asylum in the end, based on a general assumption that the application is unfounded. Human rights groups have argued the SCO policy violates the Geneva Convention. Widely used at the national level, officials proposed the creation of a supranational SCO list in the early 2000s. However, disagreements among member states over what countries to deem “safe,” as well as the 2008 ECJ ruling to place the European Parliament in a co---decision (as opposed to consultative) position for the creation of the EU SCO list have led of an impasse. This paper will argue that the deadlock is temporary. Firstly, the paper will use neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism to argue that bargaining among member states for the creation of a supranational SCO list would have negative implications for asylum seekers. Secondly, the paper will argue that in the post---Lisbon environment, member states will Learn how to work more closely with the Parliament. This, coupled with ongoing integration in other asylum policies will lead to a spillover,making the revival of the EU SCO Debate - and hence cooperation in this matter - unavoidable. The paper will also explore whether placing Parliament in a co---decision role would strengthen migrants’ rights
