From Governance to Management: Implementation Regimes in Municipal Organisations, or the (Dis-)Empowerment of Managers and its Significance for Managerial Effectiveness

Middle managers are links between the level of municipal governance where politicians set goals and allocate resources, and the operational levels where political signals and resources are turned into services and decisions with real consequences for citizens. Precisely how the managers are linked to political decisions and how the links work is less known. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the variety of linkage regimes found in local government in Norway, and also to analyse the consequences flowing from different types of regimes, especially their effectiveness with regard to goal achievement. Local government has long pursued organisational reforms that reflect ideals of corporate governance as (purportedly) found in business life . According to such ideals politicians should concentrate on “steering instead of rowing” and “let managers manage”. In this mode of governance, to maintain political control over implementation managers are subject to a regime of extensive delegation and judicious reporting. Nevertheless, as is well known, politicians have difficulty in abstaining from interfering in matters that should, ideally, be left in the hands of managers. Alternatively, they do not always take a great deal of interest in reading reports on achievements and problems on the ground, focusing instead on political rivalries or ideological conflicts . There is also evidence demonstrating that bureaucratic patterns of administration are alive and well in local government as well as more nefarious modes of governance from a supposedly by-gone age characterised by dominance of local elites, patronage and camaraderie (or neighbourlieness, if you look at it in a more positive perspective). The paper classifies implementation regimes into four categories: - Corporate governance = extensive delegation and extensive reporting - Bureaucratic governance= reporting without delegation - Professional autocracy = delegation without reporting - Anarchy = neither delegation nor reporting. This classification represents a departure from previous approaches that have sought to analyse the position of managers through a “role model” approach. Here, an interactive approach is chosen, in which systemic features are highlighted. The analysis seeks to determine, furthermore, under what circumstances the respective regimes prevail, and to identify consequences of the various regimes, especially in terms of goal achievement. Four explanatory models are developed, foucussing on local politics, municipal size, professional traditions, and organisational climate. Theoretically, the paper contrasts two rather different traditions: evolutionaly institutionalism and agency theory. The paper draws on a survey of middle managers in Norwegian local government with responses from 1354 managers. The data base also includes data on the municipalities and their organisational and financial situation and other background data on local communities.