In this paper, I will explore the relationship between Kant’s notion of “common ownership of the earth” (communio fundi originaria) and his account of provisional rights to land.
The notion of common ownership of the earth seems to play a role only for accounting for the juridical possibility of unilateral acts of first acquisition and consequently to lose its significance once all parts of the earth have been acquired. However, when considering the right to visit (Besuchsrecht) in cosmopolitan right, it becomes clear that common ownership of the earth presents itself under two different modes: on the one hand as the original right of visitors to offer themselves for interaction and as the acquired provisional right of the host people to their land. This acquired right imposes constraints on the original right to offer oneself to interaction (interaction ought to follow the terms and conditions of the hosts, and not of the guests).
I will argue that the notion of common ownership of the earth is not restricted to prima occupatio and that it plays an important normative role for Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan right. Further, I argue that Kant’s limitation of cosmopolitan right to a minimal right to offer oneself to interaction (without guarantee of admission) must be understood as a condition for the possibility of future peremptory rights.
