Reflective Equilibrium as a Central Methodological Framework of the Political Philosophy and Its Impact on The Whole Discipline

For the past decade we have witnessed an outburst of discussions concerning the methods of political philosophy (mostly its prevailing analytical branch) resulting in the emergence of the first propaedeutic literature systematizing and summarizing existing methodological approaches and frameworks (see e. g. Blau 2018, List and Valentini 2016, Leopold and Stears 2008). To understand the cause and the possible impact of these discussions, we need to perceive them in the broader context given by the problematic position of political philosophy within the positivist-oriented political science (and problematic relation between philosophy and science as such). The paper presented aims to outline such context and explain how similar tendencies - if narrowly linked to the particular paradigm - might lead to the limitation of epistemological scope and the critical capacity of the political philosophy. The central argument of the paper relates to the idea that one of the features that political philosophy incorporated from positivist-oriented science is the urge for validation of its normative outcomes and theories. One of the methodological frameworks developed for these purposes is the so-called reflective equilibrium that is nowadays being considered as the most widely used method in the moral and political philosophy (Varner 2012: 11 in Knight 2017: 46, Rawls 1999, 15–18, 40–46; Daniels 2013 in List, Valentini 2016: 17). Reflective equilibrium aims to reveal our moral intuitions and harmonize our considered judgments about them into a coherent moral theory. Even though there is no consensus about the metatheoretical basis of reflective equilibrium and many authors object the idea that moral intuitions serve as an independent evidence, there is general shift towards axiomatization at the initial phase of equilibrium that is linked to the seemingly neutral (not-normative) concepts, such as rationality, reasonableness, effectivity, epistemic superiority which in fact serve as an unjustified normative inputs within whole process. Furthermore, reflective equilibrium has been widely criticized for its effects, such as the avoidance of controversial questions that are mostly linked to the metaphysics, meta-ethics, and religion (Norman 1998: 284), as well as its interconnection to the liberal paradigm (especially the Rawlsian strand). • BLAU, Adrian. Methods in Analytical Political Theory. Cambridge University Press. 2018. • DANIELS, Norman, "Reflective Equilibrium", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/reflective-equilibrium/>. • KNIGHT, Karl. “Reflective Equilibrium”. IN: BLAU, Adrian. Methods in Analytical Polit-ical Theory. Cambridge University Press. 2018. • LEOPOLD, David et STEARS Marc. Political theory: methods and approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. • LIST, Christian et VALENTINI, Laura. „Methodology of political theory. “In: CAPPELEN, Herman, Tamar GENDLER a John HAWTHORNE. The Oxford handbook of philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2016. • NORMAN, Wayne. „Inevitable and Unacceptable?' Methodological Rawlsianism in Anglo-American Political Philosophy “. Political Studies. XLVI, 27. 294. 1998.