Global Public Reason and its Critics: How Many Ways are there to be Reasonable?

The public reason approach, which states that political institutions must be justifiable to all persons over whom they have authority, is one of the most influential and widely received approaches in contemporary normative theory. In line with its origin in critical theory, it is its highest ambition to ensure freedom and autonomy for all. Yet lately voices are becoming louder, warning that the public reason approach falls short of precisely these goals. This paper explores in which ways the well-reasoned criticisms of the public reason framework raised by feminist, postcolonial and poststructuralist theoreticians can be taken up to mitigate the weaker aspects of this approach. This enterprise is particularly important because shortcomings that are already apparent in the domestic realm are likely to exacerbate at the international level. The criticism of the public reason approach presents itself in a threefold way: (1) doubts on the suitability of reason as a normative standard because of its history of exclusion and infantilization of persons and arguments on Eurocentrist, racist and sexist etc. grounds; (2) concerns that the universality of reason produces a uniformity which fails to account for and even suppresses societal pluralism thus risking to become an instrument of oppression; and (3) concerns about the lack of effective mechanisms of self-reflexivity to counter structural oppression and to actively involve those who are affected by it. The contribution of the paper will be to systematize the different strands of criticism of the public reason approach and to explore to what extent a dialogue with them helps to make progress on the question of how international institutions can be justified and which institutional adjustments are necessary to meet the demands of its critics. Central to this is first and foremost a strong and consistent commitment to pluralism, which must be reflected in procedural standards and decision rules. Furthermore, political institutions must find ways to consider how its policies affect those whose voices are yet being largely ignored. They must reinforce their willingness to perpetually call their foundations into question to meet the causes of the excluded. The following mechanisms, among others, are conceivable to achieve this: (1) an expansion of mainstreaming policies considering but also transcending categories such as “gender”, “race” and “ability” in order to assess in an unbiased way who is disadvantaged by an institution or policy and cannot voice her concern; (2) the expansion and strengthening of a right of contestation coupled with a provision of the material, practical and time-related means to make use of this right; (3) the practical and financial promotion of counter-publics.