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Local Politics, the ‘Ndrangheta and the Alps: Evidence from a Collusive Network in Valle D’Aosta, Italy.

Institutions
Interest Groups
Local Government
Organised Crime
Political Competition
Social Capital
Corruption
Decision Making
Joselle Dagnes
Università degli Studi di Torino
Joselle Dagnes
Università degli Studi di Torino
Rocco Sciarrone
Università degli Studi di Torino

Abstract

The scientific literature has shown that collusive relationships between criminal, economic, and political actors – namely the grey area – are crucial for the mafia’s expansion in non-traditional areas, as well as for its reproduction and reinforcement in the home territory. Adopting this perspective, the paper aims to deepen the functioning and the specificity of the social networks where mafiosi are embedded, focusing on the rationale for the way in which different kinds of actors (i.e. entrepreneurs, politicians, civil servants, members of the liberal professions, and mafiosi) are connected. Specifically, attention will be devoted to: i) the position occupied by each individual within the network (e.g. peripheral vs. central, stable vs. variable); ii) the kind of advantages chased (e.g. personal vs. group benefits; pursuit of wealth, electoral success, control over the local society); iii) the resources used to promote exchanges (e.g. economic resources, technical expertise, social influence, violence); iv) the game types put in place (e.g. cooperative vs. non-cooperative, symmetric vs. asymmetric, zero-sum vs. non-zero-sum, simultaneous vs. sequential, one-shot vs. repeated). The relevance and the specificity of the above-mentioned dimensions will be examined through the reconstruction of an empirical case study in a non-traditional area in Northern Italy, focusing on the autonomous region of Valle d’Aosta, where recent judicial investigations have highlighted the existence of a structured ‘ndrangheta group strongly embedded in the economic and – especially – political-institutional local spheres. The case appears particularly suitable for our purposes because of its complexity – with a wide range of actors belonging to the grey area – but at the same of its limited dimension (less than 20 people involved). These features directly rely on the specific context characterising the region: in fact, Valle d’Aosta is the smallest region in Italy, with less than one hundred and thirty thousand inhabitants, and enjoys special administrative status, with large political autonomy and monetary transfers from central government. In such a context, local political institutions play a fundamental role in the regional economy, building consensus through the distribution of resources that, according to many observers, has often been particularistic. For these reasons, the Valle d’Aosta case allow to examine on a small scale and, in a certain sense, in a clearer way the typical exchange dynamics at work in the grey area. The analysis is based on empirical data collected ad hoc through judicial investigations, documentary reports issued by law enforcement, and semi-structured interviews with key informants, selected by judgemental sampling based on evidence from judicial and documentary sources. The interviews involve journalists, local politicians, entrepreneurs, public officials, magistrates and law enforcement officers.