This paper studies political polarization in Ukraine. It examines complementarities between support for far-right parties and public support for armed, voluntary movements associated with far-right ideology. It investigates variation in positive and negative individual level evaluations of voluntary fighting units (Azov regiment and Aidar battalion) alongside support for far-right political parties (Right Sector, National Movement of D. Yarosh and Svoboda). The paper uses a framework of complements to understand the relationship between public support for conventional and unconventional political participation. It finds differences in complementarities. Attitudes towards Azov and Aidar have centrifugal effects on the Ukrainian party system. The paper uses an original survey with list experiments conducted in May 2016, covering over 2000 respondents. It focuses on public support for parties and for voluntary armed movements that publicly embrace neo-nazi symbols.
Scholars of the far-right have noticed that neo-nazi subcultures do not map onto the strength of far-right parties. The non-trivial relationship between the strength of social movements / voluntary associations and electoral outcomes has been noted by Ruud Koopmans (1997). He outlined a proposition that protest (voluntary mobilization) and conventional political behavior (voting) can be complementary or substitutes. If support for non-violent and violent forms of political mobilization differs, do we know why? Surprisingly, from the standpoint of the literature on voting for far-right parties, little is known about the mechanics that translate grievances associated with far-right ideologies either into electoral participation or into participation or public support for uncivil society.
