This paper will explore the fringes of the fiscal contract theory by advancing the understanding of conditions that limit the role of taxation in state-society relations and for state legitimacy? It will answer this from a macro perspective framed by a novel conceptualisation of the fiscal social contract. The fiscal social contract is defined as a complex fiscal relationship structured around the provision of revenue, services and political influence, including a range of positive exchanges (e.g., taxation for services) and negative exchanges (e.g., tax exemptions for political support). It rests on a mutual recognition between the different contract parties and a collective understanding and expectation of who provides revenue and who receives which services in a society, and it is to a wide extent shaped by history, political and economic circumstances as well as social institutions. Compared to a commonly applied exchange-based understanding of the fiscal contract, this conceptualisation integrates expectations into the contractual fiscal relations between state and society. Empirically, the question is approached with an interpretive study of cases of social accountability in Senegal, covering different societal and economic sectors. I find that state-society relations in Senegal are generally defined by non-fiscal features and where tax-related arguments feature in societal actors’ accountability demands, it does so in ways different from what is expected by the fiscal contract theory. I use these findings as basis for discussing how the contextualised meaning and potential role of taxation for state-society relations and state legitimacy is shaped by social and political institutions in a country, influencing societal and the state’s demand for a tax-centred fiscal social contract.
