This article discusses the security implications of the energy trade between Turkey and Russia. As a growing economy, Turkey's energy consumption has grown over the last decade, and is projected to continued to do so. Since Turkey's indigenous energy reserves are relatively poor, Turkey has come to rely on energy imports, particularly Russian natural gas, which in turn resulted in a high level of energy dependency for Turkey. Moscow strategically wields its monopoly power over Ankara not only to secure Turkey's support for Russia's major energy transport projects like the South Stream but also to influence Turkey's security strategy in the Caspian region and the broader Middle East. Thus, its energy dependence on Russian natural gas appears like a clear liability for Turkish foreign policy. At the same time, Russia needs Turkey’s cooperation as the latter offers the most feasible transit route for Russian natural gas to reach Europe. Without access to European markets, Russian hydrocarbon reserves has little strategic value for Moscow. In other words, Russia needs Turkey just as much as Turkey needs Russia. How does the resulting asymmetric interdependence affect the prospects of security cooperation between Russia and Turkey? In this article, I evaluate this question from the competing neo-liberal and realist perspectives. Based on an examination of energy trade data and analysis of Russian and Turkish foreign policy strategies, I show that the energy trade between Russia and Turkey and the resulting asymmetric distribution of relative gains is more likely to foster conflict than cooperation in the long run.
