Economic Governance: A Field of ‘Conflictual Cooperation’?

This article analyses the relationship amongst national parliaments (NPs) and between them and the European Parliament (EP) in the field of economic governance. In doing so, it uses the principle of sincere cooperation and Chantal Mouffe’s account of ‘conflictual consensus’ to elaborate a conceptual framework for the inter-parliamentary relationship in this particular policy area. By drawing on two case studies, one in the field of fiscal and macroeconomic policy coordination and one on the Banking Union, the contribution argues that the relationship between the EP and NPs in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is affected by the nature of the competence at stake, the mode and structure of decision-making and by the salience of the policy. In economic governance ‘conflictual cooperation’ among parliaments is emerging on the organization and functioning of inter-parliamentary relationships rather than on substantive policy options. Despite the confrontational dynamic often underlying the relationship between the EP and NPs as well as the relationships amongst NPs, the value of the vertical (and horizontal) inter-parliamentary cooperation is not put into question by the same institutional actors. This ‘conflictual cooperation’ is inherent and probably inevitable in EU inter-parliamentary relationships and its impact can be assessed on the grounds of the ability of inter-parliamentary cooperation to nonetheless redress the information asymmetries parliaments are facing on economic governance with a view to positively impacting on the individual and collective ability of legislatures to scrutinize the EU fragmented executive.