The political representation of ethnic groups/minorities is crucial for managing ethnic conflict. Institutional theories have mostly focused on how cooperation between groups can be induced and maintained and on how and which institutions best enable the representation of minority group interests. The question whether and how ethnic groups are internally organized presents a gap in research. This paper argues that for a successful national level representation of the group, it is crucial that ethnic minority parties internal organisation of political competition meets democratic standards.
Ethnic minorities are often represented in politics by their own ethnic parties, which represent a community that shares a common identity. Since in many cases ethnic minorities cannot afford more than one party without endangering their representation at the national level, some ethnic minority parties manage to monopolize the representation of the ethnic minority. A monopolized representation of the group might strengthen its influence in political decision-making at the national level. In this case, political competition within the ethnic minority has to be confined to the party. The necessity for the monopoly of group representation however can also lead to the crowding out of internal political competition, which undermines the internal representativeness of the party. Party development is therefore under the pressure of conflicting goals between different levels.
This paper discusses the case of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ). The RMDSZ has developed a monopoly over the political representation of the Hungarian minority and represented the Hungarians in the Romanian government over several periods. Gradually, the party has lost its internal representativeness toward the group and it has been challenged by Hungarian political competitors from the outside. Furthermore, it has also lost a considerable part of its electoral support which weakens effectiveness at the national level.
