The ‘Troika’ in Its Own Words: Responding to the Politicisation of the Southern European Crises

For over a decade, integration theory has tried to make sense of the growing politicisation of the European Union and of its effects. The relevant literature has widely accepted the post-functionalist hypothesis that growing politicisation constrains further integration. Yet, the euro crisis has led to a rise in contentious politics, especially in the most affected countries, and to a concomitant deepening of EU integration, namely in the areas of economic governance. The coincidence of these processes raises a challenge to the dominating ‘constraining dissensus’ hypothesis. This paper argues that the ‘troika’ of creditors (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) and its intervention in the struggles over framing of the southern European crises played a fundamental role in taming the constraint imposed by the generalised dissensus. The argument is grounded on the qualitative analysis of over 1200 public declarations produced by the three institutions from 2009 to 2016. It is observed that, throughout the period, the troika actively ‘responded’ to processes of heightened politicisation, reproducing the dominant crisis narrative of the southern European periphery and making the case for the adequacy and inevitability of austerity. The troika’s success in framing the euro crisis as a result of domestic failure and moral hazard, contributed to the legitimation of further integration of European economic governance.