This paper deals with Kant's notion of civil independence which plays a central role in Kant's account of citizenship. In particular, it provides the basis for Kant's notorious distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizens: only persons who possess civil independence are deemed ‘fit to vote’ and hence have rights of political participation.Based on this criterion Kant excludes from active citizenship all privately employed persons as well as all women. Most interpreters take Kant's notion of independence as simply reflecting his bourgeois and misogynistic prejudices.
In this paper I shall provide a systematic interpretation of Kant's notion of civil independence that, on the hand, lends credibility to the criterion within Kant's political philosophy, and, on the other, allows us to internally criticise Kant's application of it. My main claim is that in the ‘Doctrine of Right’, civil independence consists in the person's independence from the will of another individual.
To substantiate this claim I shall draw on Kant's Private Right and especially Domestic Right. Kant understands contractual as well as household relations as relations of wills. In particular, the household community is conceived by Kant as a union of wills which is directed towards its inherent end by a single individual, the master of the household. The others members of the household, as well as employees, subordinate their wills under that of the master, respectively their employer. This is what makes them unfit for voting in Kant's view.
I believe we can internally criticise Kant's substantial views by recurring to the fact that both within household and contractual relationships, persons never give up their entire will (for that would amount to slavery). Thus, we might retain the normative concept of civil independence as independence of will, while rejecting Kant's exclusion of privately employed people and women from political participation.
