“Is it better to be powerless but autonomous or to be powerful but dependent?” (Liberti, 2013). This is the question French experts and politicians have to answer two decades after the end of the Cold War, as they decide on a new Defence White Paper under President Hollande – and it is a question that particularly applies in the field of nuclear policy.
France has undergone significant transformations since signing the NPT in 1992, including ratifying the CTBT, supporting an FMCT, and engaging with new initiatives like the 'minilateral' PSI, or the P5 confidence-building dialogue.
True to her Gaullist history, however, France still has one of the most nation-centred nuclear politics. A fundamentally transformed security environment and the need for deep budgetary cuts make further changes in the French strategic posture unavoidable.
This paper first analyses French engagement in the fields of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament since 1992, outlining how French strategic culture has shaped and been shaped by its interaction with the nuclear order. It then uses this analysis to explore, from a French perspective, potential new initiatives and instruments that could complement classical approaches to these issues. In so doing, it tackles the following questions:
What are the preferred forms and forums of French engagement with the nuclear order: multilateral, minilateral, 'coalition of the willing', and/or unilateral? Can such approaches coexist?
What are the effects of France’s focus on autonomy? For example, how does the French nuclear establishment approach multilateral institutions, or civil society actors?
From the French perspective, what are the conditions for progress on more flexible approaches to arms control such as transparency and confidence building measures?
In answering these questions, the paper seeks to draw implications about future French engagement with the contemporary nuclear order, and the interaction between its overlapping components.
