Activism and Objectivity in Political Philosophy

There are two starkly opposed views on the proper relationship between academic research and political activism. The first argues that, like civil servants, scholars must remain politically neutral. The second argues that academics can and should also be political activists. Given that normative political philosophy necessarily takes controversial positions on political matters—and hence cannot qualify as politically neutral—it might seem that political philosophers must side with the scholar-activists in this dispute. This paper argues that such a conclusion is mistaken, and that political philosophy at its best embodies an ethos that is neither wholly activist nor wholly neutral. This form of critical, open-minded political engagement is, I argue, grounded in a recognizably scholarly attitude toward political principles. Normative political philosophy cannot be neutral, but at its best it can be described as objective, at least in some senses of the term. This form of “distancing” objectivity involves a commitment to seeing the world and a healthy skepticism toward political grandstanding, which is often distorted by a distinctively political form of wishful thinking. I conclude that scholars, activists, and scholar-activists alike would all benefit from this ethos of skepticism and objectivity. In this way, political philosophy can be useful to political practice, not only through the application of specific principles, but also through the modelling of certain moral, political, and epistemic virtues.