Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Russian Orthodox Church has experienced the fall of ties that were in place during the times of anti-religious Soviet propaganda and has been growing as an independent political actor. The insistent ‘return to spirituality’ that began in Russia after the perestroika (as opposed to the anti-spiritual Soviet state) brought political elites and the Church representatives together: Russia’s new leaders (many of which had been explicitly atheist in the USSR) became frequent church-goers, the Church got a lot of its earlier expropriated property and lands back, also becoming a major economic agent in Russia. ROC, encompassing 160 dioceses (‘eparchies’) all over the world, claims to be the main instrument of supporting ties with Russian-speaking and/or Orthodox communities abroad, most importantly – in the former Soviet countries. Declarations of the ‘centuries-long cultural unity’ between such communities lead the Church to insisting on closer post-Soviet re-integration and even unification with the ‘Slavic brother-nations’ (Ukraine, Belarus), thus providing ideological support to the government’s policies towards such countries. ROC doctrine is based on the idea of Moscow being ‘the Third Rome’, Russians being ‘the God-bearing people’, and insisting on Russia’s unique development path. Such ideology is readily used in the justification of Russia’s anti-Western, insulational policies because Western liberal values (not shared by the current authorities) are condemned as ‘spiritless and individualistic’. ROC’s fight for the preservation of ‘traditional Russian values’ has also brought to banning Halloween at schools, deterioration of the situation with LGBT-rights, etc. ROC even has its own representation offices at the UN, OSCE and PACE, which allows it to push conservative Russian agenda . So, this ideological re-unification of the State and the Church in Russia can be explored as an interesting example of the resurrection of religion as a major political force.
